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We build a model in which ￿nancial intermediaries provide insurance to households against
a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a ￿nancial market if they pay
a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the
market. This can be bene￿cial because intermediaries invest less in the productive tech-
nology when they provide more risk-sharing. Our model predicts that bank-oriented
economies should grow slower than more market-oriented economies, which is consistent
with some recent empirical evidence. We show that the mix of intermediaries and market
that maximizes welfare under a given level of ￿nancial development depends on economic
fundamentals. We also show the optimal mix of two structurally very similar economies
can be very di￿erent.
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JEL Classi￿cation: E44, G10, G20Non technical summary
The economics literature distinguishes between bank-dominated and market-oriented ￿-
nancial systems. We analyze in a growth model the factors that are important in deter-
mining which type of ￿nancial system is optimal. Several e￿ects have to be balanced.
One of the main functions of banks is to provide an e￿cient risk-sharing mechanism
to the non-￿nancial sector. Banks’ deposit contracts, for instance, o￿er an e￿cient way
for households to insure against liquidity shocks. If households need their funds after a
short period of time, deposits pay a comparably high interest (or at least they can be liq-
uidated without any substantial transaction cost). In contrast, if held for a longer period
the interest received on deposits is below the return on alternative long-term investments.
Thus the deposit contract implies an insurance mechanism that implements a redistribu-
tion of funds from those households that do not have an immediate consumption need to
those that have. However, the degree to which banks can really o￿er such an insurance
is limited by households’ access to ￿nancial markets. The reason for that is very simple:
If households have e￿cient access to ￿nancial markets they can elude this redistribution
scheme and invest in alternative long-term assets if they do not have an immediate liq-
uidity need. Thus because it limits the e￿ciency of the available risk sharing, increased
￿nancial market access of households has a negative welfare e￿ect.
However, a higher degree of risk-sharing also brings about a higher overall investment
in liquid funds. The overall portfolio fraction of long-term, high productive investments
in the economy is therefore reduced. Since a higher investment ratio accelerates growth,
an improved households’ ￿nancial market access that reduces the available risk-sharing
has a positive growth e￿ect.
In this paper we formalize the trade-o￿ between these two e￿ects. We show that indeed
a bank-dominated ￿nancial system in which households have limited ￿nancial market
access provides more e￿cient risk-sharing but slows down growth, while the reverse holds
for more market-oriented ￿nancial systems in which households hold larger parts of their
portfolio in non-intermediated ￿nancial claims. The optimal degree of bank dominance
therefore depends on the ‘deep parameters’ of the economy￿particularly on the available
production technology and households’ risk aversion. For instance, the more risk averse
households are the more preferable is a bank-dominated ￿nancial system. Thus our resultshelp explain, why di￿erent types of ￿nancial systems emerged in di￿erent economies (or
in the same economy in di￿erent periods).
3Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
In der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Literatur werden Finanzsysteme in marktorientierte
und bankdominierte Systeme unterschieden. In diesem Papier wird im Rahmen eines
Wachstumsmodells untersucht, welche Faktoren wichtig sind, wenn man Aussagen ￿ber
die Optimalit￿t des einen oder anderen Systems tre￿en m￿chte. Dabei m￿ssen ver-
schiedene E￿ekte gegeneinander abgewogen werden.
Eine wichtige Funktion von Banken ist es, dem nicht-￿nanziellen Sektor eine e￿ziente
Risikoteilung zu erm￿glichen. Der Einlagenvertrag von Banken beispielsweise erlaubt pri-
vaten Haushalten eine e￿ziente Absicherung von Liquidit￿tsrisiken. Ben￿tigen Haushalte
ihre Mittel nach relative kurzer Zeit zur￿ck, versprechen Einlagen dennoch eine ver-
gleichsweise hohe Verzinsung (bzw. erm￿glichen zumindest eine Liquidation ohne nen-
nenswerte Transaktionskosten). Bleiben die Mittel allerdings l￿ngerfristig in Einlagen an-
gelegt, so liegt die Verzinsung unter derjenigen anderer l￿ngerfrister Anlagem￿glichkeiten.
Der Einlagenvertrag impliziert also eine Umverteilung von Haushalten ohne gegenw￿rti-
gen Konsumwunsch zu solchen mit einem unmittelbaren Konsumbed￿rfnis. Das Aus-
ma￿, in dem der Bankeinlagenvertrag gegen Liquidit￿tsrisiken absichern kann, wird aller-
dings durch den Finanzmarktzugang der privaten Haushalte begrenzt. Denn je e￿zienter
Haushalte am Finanzmarkt direkt investieren k￿nnen, umso eher k￿nnen sie sich dem
Umverteilungsmechanismus des Einlagenvertrages entziehen, wenn sie keinen unmittel-
baren Konsumwunsch haben. Ein verbesserter Finanzmarktzugang mindert demnach die
verf￿gbare Risikoteilung und hat insofern einen negativen Wohlfahrtse￿ekt.
Eine h￿heres Ma￿ an Risikoteilung bringt allerdings ein verst￿rktes Halten liquider
Mittel in der ￿konomie mit sich. Der Portfolioanteil von langfristigen, produktiveren
Investitionen geht folglich zur￿ck. Da eine h￿here Investitionsquote aber mit einem be-
schleunigten Wachstum einhergeht, hat die durch einen verbesserten Finanzmarktzugang
der Haushalte verminderte Risikoteilung einen positiven Wachstumse￿ekt.
In diesem Papier formalisieren wir die Wechselwirkung dieser beiden E￿ekte. Wir
zeigen, dass Volkwirtschaften mit bankdominierten Finanzsystemen, in denen Haushalte
nur begrenzt an den Finanzm￿rkten direkt partizipieren, ein hohes Ma￿ an Risikoteilung
bei geringerem Wachstum aufweisen. St￿rker marktorientierte Finanzsysteme, in denen
die Haushalte einen gr￿￿eren Anteil ihres Portfolios direkt an den Finanzm￿rkten anle-gen, beschleunigen das gesamtwirtschaftliche Wachstum bei einer weniger umfassenden
Risikoteilung. Der optimale Grad an Bankendominanz eines Finanzsystems h￿ngt fol-
glich von Parametern wie der verf￿gbaren Produktionstechnologie und der Risikoaversion
der Haushalte ab. Je risikoaverser die privaten Haushalte sind, umso st￿rker bankendo-
miniert sollte beispielsweise ein Finanzsystem sein. Das Papier tr￿gt somit zur Begr￿n-
dung bei, warum sich in unterschiedlichen Volkswirtschaften (beziehungsweise in einer
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1 Introduction
An important question related to both growth and ￿nance theory is whether the ￿nancial
system in￿uences growth in the long-run. We build a model in which ￿nancial markets
reduce the amount of risk-sharing ￿nancial intermediaries can provide but promote invest-
ment in a productive technology. Hence, in our model, market-oriented ￿nancial systems
yield more growth, but provide less risk-sharing than bank-oriented system. Which system
provides the highest welfare is ambiguous.
We build on a model by Fecht (2004) in which banks play two di￿erent roles: First, as
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they provide insurance to consumers against preference
shocks. Second, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001), the re￿nancing from numerous
small depositors enables banks - in contrast to other ￿nancial institutions - to credibly
commit not to renegotiate on the repayment obligations on deposits, because this would
immediately trigger a run. While banks can e￿ciently monitor projects, households have
to pay a cost to do so and become a sophisticated investor. As shown in Fecht (2004), a
trade-o￿ arises between the ability for the bank to provide risk-sharing and the number
of sophisticated depositors. We embed the static model into a dynamic overlapping gen-
erations structure, as in Ennis and Keister (2003). In this context a trade-o￿ between the
amount of risk-sharing provided by banks and growth arises. An increase in risk-sharing
¤Fecht: Economics Department, Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt
am Main, Germany. Huang: Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Inde-
pendence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106, USA; and CIRP￿E, Canada. Martin: Research Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 925 Grand Boulevard, Kansas City, MO 64198, USA. We thank
Jerry Hanweck, Paula Hernandez-Verme, Frederick Joutz, Todd Keister, as well as seminar participants
at the University of Missouri, Texas A&M, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the 2004 Missouri
Economic Conference, the 2004 WAFA/FDIC Conference, the 2004 Midwest Macro Meeting, the 2004
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ciation Meeting for useful comments. All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed here are
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1implies less investment in productive assets and less growth, because a higher degree of
risk-sharing goes along with larger liquidity holdings in any point in time.
While we believe that this trade-o￿ is important, it should be noted that our model
focuses on the liability-side of banks. Thus, because some activities on the asset-side
of banks may promote growth, our results could overstate the growth reducing impact
of bank-oriented system.1 Empirical evidence provided by Beck and Levine (2002) and
Levine (2002) suggests that a more developed ￿nancial system promotes growth. However,
they fail to ￿nd any evidence that the composition of the ￿nancial system, whether it is
bank- or market-based, under a given level of ￿nancial development in￿uences growth.
More recently however, Ergungor (2003) shows that, when the ￿exibility of the legal
system is taken into account, empirical evidence suggests that market-based ￿nancial
systems promote growth in countries with ￿exible legal systems compared to bank-based
systems.2 The reason is that activities on the asset-side of banks have less of a growth-
enhancing role in countries with ￿exible legal systems then in countries with in￿exible
legal systems. Hence, it is not surprising that the growth-reducing e￿ect of bank-oriented
system that our paper describes should be more apparent in countries with ￿exible legal
systems.
There is a large literature on the nexus between ￿nancial systems and economic growth.
See Levine (1997) for a review. However, most of this literature is concerned with the
e￿ect of ￿nancial development on the e￿ciency of investments; i.e., on capital produc-
tivity. Only a limited number of papers deal with the impact of ￿nancial systems on
households’ saving decisions￿the portfolio choice between liquidity holdings and long-
term investments￿and their e￿ect on economic growth. For instance, Jappelli and Pagano
1Chakraborty and Ray (2003) emphasize the asset-side of banks.
2Those countries that are perceived to have a ￿exible legal system are common-law countries. En-
gungor (2004), for instance, argues that because judges have more discretion to interpret the codes in
common law countries, they have more ￿exibility in adapting the law to changing economic conditions.
In contrast, in civil law countries judges cannot interpret the codes and adapt them to new economic
situations. Thus given incomplete contracts some con￿icts may not be solvable in civil law countries.
This creates an additional e￿ciency enhancing role for banks in enforcing incomplete contracts in these
countries.
Countries with ￿exible legal systems and market-oriented ￿nancial systems include the US and the UK.
Those with bank-oriented ￿nancial system include Belgium, Finland, and Norway. The extent to which
the ￿nancial system is bank-oriented in these countries is comparable to Germany. Denmark and the
Netherland are slightly less bank-oriented.
2(1994) show that ￿nancial market imperfections may increase the savings rate and thus
growth by limiting households’ ability to smooth consumption over the life cycle. Thus
their ￿ndings are closely related to our results. But in our model an increasing e￿ciency of
￿nancial markets restrains banks in providing e￿cient risk-sharing and thereby increases
long-term investment and growth. Levine (1991) studies the e￿ect that the existence of
a ￿nancial market has on growth in a Diamond-Dybvig setup. He shows that - com-
pared to a situation in which households are autarkic - the possibility to sell long-term
￿nancial claims in the case of liquidity needs increases households willingness to invest in
these claims ex-ante, increasing investment and growth. Similarly, Bencivenga and Smith
(1991) argue that the introduction of a bank in such an economy has an analogous e￿ect
on investment and growth. But these papers do not compare the degree of liquidity insur-
ance provided by the market with those provided by the bank. Neither do they consider
the interaction of markets and intermediaries. In our paper, in contrast, we focus on the
interaction between ￿nancial markets and intermediaries. Intermediaries are shown to
promote risk-sharing at the cost of growth, while markets have the opposite e￿ect. Thus
we derive the optimal mix of banks and markets.
Our paper is also related to those models that are concerned with the optimal degree of
bank-dominance at di￿erent levels of economic development. Some such papers argue that
developing countries have more bank-oriented ￿nancial systems and that, in the process
of development, a gradual evolution toward a more market-oriented system occurs. The
importance of banks in developing countries can be explained by informational asymme-
tries. A high ￿xed cost of setting up a well functioning ￿nancial market can help explain
the evolution towards a more market-oriented system over time. For example, Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1990) study a model in which growth spurs the development of ￿nancial
intermediaries who, in turn, enhance growth. See also Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001).
We provide numerical examples that suggest our model can account for the transition
from a bank-oriented system to a market-oriented system. Hence, our paper suggests a
di￿erent story based on an endogenous trade-o￿ between risk-sharing and growth.
Our paper is also related to a literature which compares the performance of markets
and intermediaries (see, for example, Antinol￿ and Kawamura 2003, Bhattacharya and
Padilla 1996, Chakraborty and Ray 2003, Fulghieri and Rovelli 1998, or Qian, John, and
3John 2004). The work which is perhaps closest in spirit to our paper is that by Allen and
Gale (1997). These authors consider an environment in which a ￿nancial intermediary
can provide risk-sharing to overlapping generations of households. However, a ￿nancial
market constrains the ability of intermediaries to provide this risk-sharing. They show
that a system with an intermediary and no market can provide a Pareto improvement
compared to a system in which the market is active.
Our model di￿ers from theirs in several respects. For example, we do not consider
intergenerational risk-sharing of shocks to the return of the production technology. Our
model considers a liquidity shock like that in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Despite these
di￿erences, our results are very close to theirs, at least in our static environment. In
both their model and ours a bank-oriented system is preferred because it allows more
risk-sharing. Further, the extent to which banks can provide risk-sharing is limited by
the ￿nancial market. However, di￿erent conclusions arise when we account for the trade-
o￿ between risk-sharing and growth in our dynamic model. Allen and Gale (1997) are
unable to study the impact of risk-sharing on growth because their results depend on the
assumption that the productive asset is in ￿xed supply. In contrast, our setup naturally
extends to a dynamic case.
This is related to another contribution of our paper. Many models of ￿nancial interme-
diation have the property that markets constrain the amount of risk-sharing intermediaries
can o￿er. This was pointed out by Jacklin (1987) about the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
model. It is also the case in Allen and Gale (1997) and particularly in Diamond (1997).
In these models ￿nancial markets lower social welfare because they prevent intermedi-
aries from providing as much risk-sharing as they could. Since markets are assumed to
provide no alternative bene￿t, there is no trade-o￿. In this paper, in contrast, a meaning-
ful trade-o￿ occurs since markets promote growth. Hence markets no longer necessarily
reduce welfare.3
3Although we focus on growth in this paper, it might be the case that ￿nancial markets provide other
bene￿ts that can be traded o￿ against the constraint they impose on intermediaries. For example, markets
o￿er a more diverse set of investment opportunities. Hence, maybe our model should be considered as
illustrative of a more fundamental point. Markets and intermediaries provide di￿erent bene￿ts and the
optimal mix of those bene￿ts might depend on parameters of the economy considered. Moreover, as we
show in Figure 5, it might be the case that two very di￿erent combinations of markets and intermediaries
provide the same welfare.
4The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the static environ-
ment. Section 3 embeds the static model of section 2 in an OLG framework and describes
our main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Static environment
The environment described in this section is similar to the one in Fecht (2004). The
economy takes place at three dates, t = 0;1;2, and is populated by a mass 1 of households,
a large number of banks, and a large number of entrepreneurs. There is a unique good in
the economy and, at date 0, households are endowed with 1 unit of this good.
Households learn at date t = 1 if they are impatient (with probability q) or patient
(with probability 1 ¡ q). In the former case they only derive utility from consumption at
date 1, and in the later case they only derive utility from consumption at date 2. Expected
utility can be written
U(c1;c2) = qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2):
The function u exhibits CRRA: u(c) = c1¡®
1¡®, with ® > 1. Whether a household is patient
or impatient is private information.
There are two production technologies in the economy: A storage technology, which
returns 1 unit of the good at date t + 1 for each unit invested at date t, t = 0;1, and
a productive technology. Both technologies are available to everyone. The productive
technology is operated costlessly by entrepreneurs who are not endowed with any goods.
Entrepreneurs decide at date 1 either to ￿behave,￿ in which case the technology has a
return of R at date 2 for each unit invested at date 0, or to ￿shirk,￿ in which case the date
2 return is only °R, with R > 1 > °R > 0.
Competition leads entrepreneurs to promise a repayment of R at date 2 for each unit
invested at date 0. At date 1 a secondary market is open on which claims to the return on
the productive technology can be exchanged for goods. In equilibrium, banks will supply
on this market the claims demanded by sophisticated households. At date 2, entrepreneurs
pay out the actual return of the project to the holder of the ￿nancial claim.
Households can either become sophisticated or remain unsophisticated. Sophisticated
households can monitor entrepreneurs perfectly and are able to replace a misbehaving
5entrepreneur without foregoing any of the expected return of the project. Thus, these
households can guarantee themselves a return of R at date 2 if they lend to entrepreneurs.
Unsophisticated households are unable to monitor entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs ￿nanced
by such households will always shirk and their projects will return only °R at date
2. Households choose whether or not to become sophisticated at date 0. To become
sophisticated, a household must pay a utility cost proportional to its expected utility,
(Â ¡ 1)[qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)], where Â ¸ 1.4
There are several ways to think of this cost. It could represent the cost of learning
to become a ￿nancial analyst or of getting an MBA. Alternatively, it could be the e￿ort
spent in order to monitor entrepreneurs. In either case, the cost could be measured in
terms of utility, resources, or both. The size of Â could be a￿ected by the development of
￿nancial markets, or the extent to which ￿nancial instruments are standardized, among
other things. We consider the cost Â as exogenously determined but discuss, in the
conclusion, some policy implications of our model in the case government policies can
in￿uence Â.
Alternatively, households can deposit their endowment in a bank rather than investing
directly in the market. Banks invest the deposits they have received in storage or in
￿nancial claims on the productive technology. They can also trade in the secondary
￿nancial market at date 1. Banks can monitor entrepreneurs costlessly and thus guarantee
a return of R for the projects they have invested in.5 Further, as in Diamond and Rajan
(2001), banks can credibly commit to pay this return to a third party by setting up a
deposit contract. Such a contract exposes banks to runs if they attempt to renegotiate the
repayments they have promised depositors.6 Thus, one role of banks in this environment
is to intermediate investment for unsophisticated households and thus allow them to
indirectly invest in the productive technology, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001).
Additionally, in this setup banks can provide liquidity insurance to depositors who do
4Assuming a proportional cost simpli￿es the analysis when we study a dynamic economy. However,
we expect our results to hold for more general speci￿cations of the cost. Our results hold also for a
proportional resource cost as we show below.
5Our results do not depend on the assumption that the return banks receive from investing in the
long-term technology is the same as the return sophisticated households get for such investment. We
assume these return are equal to simplify the exposition.
6See Diamond and Rajan (2000) for a more complete exposition of this argument.
6not know whether they will be patient or impatient, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
However, if they do so the fragility of deposit ￿nancing that enables banks to e￿ciently
intermediate investment for unsophisticated households brings about the existence of a
second equilibrium. In this run equilibrium all depositors withdraw their deposits simply
because they expect that other depositors will do the same and the bank will therefore
run out of funds. In this paper we focus on the good equilibrium and do not consider
bank runs.7
2.1 Equilibrium allocation
In this section we derive the deposit contract o￿ered by banks. At the beginning of date 0,
banks choose the deposit contract they o￿er households and households decide whether or
not to become sophisticated simultaneously.8 Let d1 denote the payment banks promise
depositors who withdraw at date 1, and d2 denote the payment banks promise depositors
who withdraw at date 2. If banks provide any insurance against the liquidity shock, then
R > d2 ¸ d1 > 1. Fecht (2004) shows arbitrage pins the price of claims on the productive
technology in the secondary market at 1 and competitive banks will supply the claims
demanded by sophisticated depositors.9 Consequently, all households strictly prefer to
deposit their endowment in a bank as long as banks provide some liquidity insurance.
Indeed, sophisticated depositors can withdraw d1 at date 1 from the bank. Since d1 > 1
the value of deposits at date 1 is greater than the resale value of claims on the productive
technology on the secondary market open at date 1. Hence, at that date, sophisticated
patient households choose to withdraw their deposits from the banks and buy claims
on the productive technology in the secondary market. For unsophisticated households,
depositing in a bank is the only way to bene￿t from the productive technology.
7The e￿ect of bank runs on growth is studied in Ennis and Keister (2003).
8If banks are allowed to move ￿rst, they can o￿er a contract under which no household has an incentive
to become sophisticated. Our results also hold in this case, as the cost of becoming sophisticated still
in￿uences the contract o￿ered by banks, but then the secondary market is inactive.
9 If the price of claims is smaller than 1, then banks invest only in the storage technology in order to
make a pro￿t when they buy claims on the secondary market. The supply of such claims would thus be
zero, implying this cannot be an equilibrium. If the price of claims is greater than 1, then banks invest
only in the productive technology in order to make a pro￿t when they sell these claims on the secondary
market to obtain goods for impatient depositors. The supply of goods at date 1 would thus be zero,
implying this cannot be an equilibrium.
7To summarize, at date 1, all impatient households withdraw and consume. Sophis-
ticated patient households withdraw from the bank and invest on the secondary market
since Rd1 ¸ d2, with a strict inequality if banks provide some liquidity insurance. Banks
are unable to prevent sophisticated households from withdrawing their deposits since a
household’s type is private information. Note that even though banks cannot observe if
a particular depositor is sophisticated or not, they can infer, in equilibrium, the fraction
of sophisticated depositors.
We can now write the problem of a competitive bank. The bank tries to maximize
the utility of its unsophisticated depositors subject to a resource constraint.10 The bank’s
objective function is
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) (1)
and the resource constraint is




where i denotes the fraction of unsophisticated depositors. The constraint says the bank
must have enough resources to pay d2 to a fraction 1 ¡ q of unsophisticated depositors
at date 2 and d1 to all sophisticated depositors as well as a fraction q of unsophisticated
depositors at date 1.
Contracts that maximize (1) subject to (2) are characterized by
d1 =
R















Such a contract will be an equilibrium contract only if it satis￿es two incentive constraints.
First, it must be the case °Rd1 · d2, otherwise unsophisticated depositors would withdraw
their deposits to buy ￿nancial claims on the secondary market. This constraint is always
satis￿ed since we assumed 1 > °R. The second constraint, which we refer to as ICS,
10Fecht (2004) shows that there does not exist a separating equilibrium for this model. A bank trying to
maximize the expected utility of sophisticated depositors would not be able to attract any unsophisticated
depositors and hence would not be able to provide any liquidity insurance. Consequently, competition
leads banks to maximize the expected utility of unsophisticated depositors.
8is Rd1 ¸ d2. This constraint guarantees that sophisticated patient households are never
strictly better o￿ by staying in the bank until date 2. When ICS holds with equality,
£ = R, and sophisticated patient depositors are indi￿erent between leaving their deposits
in the bank and withdrawing them to invest in the secondary market. In this case, banks




®¡1 + (1 ¡ q)
¤¡1 : (6)
ICS binds whenever i · i. If this happens, the contract is given by equations (3) and (4)
with £ = R.
The equilibrium mass of unsophisticated depositors, i, is determined by the condi-
tion that depositors must be indi￿erent between becoming sophisticated or remaining
unsophisticated. This condition is
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) = Â[qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d1R)]: (7)
We can use equations (3) and (4) to substitute for d1 and d2 in that expression. Then,






(Â ¡ 1): (8)
Using the de￿nition of £, we obtain the following expression for i
i =
(


















It can easily be seen that an increase in Â, the cost of becoming sophisticated, will lead
to an increase in i, the fraction of unsophisticated depositors. As expected, i = i if there
is no cost of becoming sophisticated, or Â = 1. We can also ￿nd the cost above which no






(1 ¡ q)R1¡® + q
: (10)
If Â ¸ ¹ Â the cost of becoming sophisticated is so high that no depositors chooses to
become sophisticated.
We can derive the amount of investment in the productive technology chosen by
banks and denoted by K. Part of the investment, (1 ¡ q)i(d2=R), is needed to pro-
vide consumption for unsophisticated patient depositors who withdraw at date 2. The
9rest, (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ i)d1 is sold to patient sophisticated depositors on the secondary market.
The expression for K is thus
K(i) = 1 ¡
q
1 ¡ (1 ¡ q)i(1 ¡ £
R)
: (11)
It is decreasing in i. In particular, K(i = i) = 1 ¡ q and
K(i = 1) = 1 ¡
q




The above model gives us a way to think about ￿nancial systems being more bank-
based or more market-oriented. When the cost of becoming sophisticated is high, there
are few such depositors (i is large) and the secondary market for ￿nancial claims is not
very active. Banks are able to o￿er a lot of liquidity insurance but there is relatively little
investment in the productive technology. Conversely, when the cost of becoming sophisti-
cated is low, there are many such depositors (i is small) and the secondary market is very
active. Banks o￿er little liquidity insurance, or none at all, but there is more aggregate
investment in the productive technology. Hence, when comparing two economies, A and
B, with a di￿erent fraction of sophisticated depositors, iA > iB, we say economy A is
more bank oriented or, equivalently, economy B is more market oriented.
The model does not provide an obvious way to compare di￿erent levels of ￿nancial
development. Hence, when comparing two economies, we are implicitly assuming that
the level of ￿nancial development in both economies is the same. Also, banks do not play
a special role in enforcing contracts in this paper.12 Since the model does not emphasize
the asset-side of banks, it is more likely to apply to countries that have a ￿exible legal
system as de￿ned by Ergungor (2003).
2.2 The resource-cost case
In this setup, a young household that decides to become sophisticated at the beginning
of period t will incur a (1 ¡ C) percent consumption loss at the end of period t or the
11Alternatively, the level of investment in the long term technology can be derived by considering what
is not consumed at date 1; i.e., K = 1 ¡ qd1.
12See Chakraborty and Ray (2003) for a model where banks play a role in enforcing contracts.
10beginning of period t + 1, for some C · 1.13 In this case, equation (7) becomes
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) = [qu(Cd1) + (1 ¡ q)u(Cd1R)]: (13)









1¡® ¡ 1): (14)
Using the de￿nition of £, we obtain the following expression for i
i =
(















The remainder of the analysis is similar.
2.3 Comparison with a planner’s allocation
It is interesting to compare the equilibrium allocation with the allocation chosen by a
planner endowed with the technologies described above. The planner’s problem is
max
c1;c2
qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)
subject to




The planner’s allocation, denoted fc¤
1;c¤





1 ¡ (1 ¡ R
1¡®








1 ¡ (1 ¡ R
1¡®
® )(1 ¡ q)
; (18)
It is straightforward to see the equilibrium allocation of an economy with i = 1 cor-
responds to the planner’s allocation. This occurs if the cost of becoming sophisticated
is su￿ciently high. In this static model, because capital accumulation does not matter,
the expected utility of households is always (weakly) decreasing as the cost of becoming
sophisticated decreases. Hence, welfare is higher when banks are able to provide more
risk-sharing between patient and impatient depositors and the ￿nancial market is small.
We can summarize the results established in this section in the following proposition.
13We implicitly assume that, at date 0, when households decide to become sophisticated or not, they
are able to commit to paying the resource cost when they receive d1 from the bank.
11Proposition 1 In this economy:
1) The fraction of unsophisticated depositors increases as the cost of becoming sophisticated
increases
2) Investment in the long-term technology decreases and risk-sharing increases as the
fraction of unsophisticated depositors increase.
3) The planner’s allocation is obtained when all households are unsophisticated.
Allen and Gale (1997) study an environment in which the market constrains how
much risk-sharing ￿nancial intermediaries can provide. In that model, they show that
having intermediaries and no ￿nancial markets is preferable to a ￿nancial market and
no intermediaries. As in our static model, the intuition for their result is that more risk
sharing is provided in the former case than in the latter.
A key feature of the model in Allen and Gale (1997) is that the productive asset is
in ￿xed supply. Hence it is di￿cult to extend that environment to include growth. In
contrast, it is straightforward to adapt our setup to a dynamic environment. The next
section shows there is a real trade-o￿ between risk-sharing and growth in a dynamic
environment. Hence, the result that bank-based ￿nancial systems are always better is
overturned in that context.
3 An OLG environment with growth
In this section, we embed the static model of the previous section in a two-period OLG
framework along the lines of Ennis and Keister (2003). This allows us to think about
how changes in the number of sophisticated households a￿ect capital accumulation and
growth.
For reasons described in the previous section, banks maximize the expected utility of
their unsophisticated depositors. Hence we could either assume that banks are long-lived
institution or that a new set of banks emerges with each new generation.14
At the beginning of each period a mass 1 of two-period lived households is born.
Households learn if they are patient or impatient at the end of the ￿rst period of their
14As in Ennis and Keister (2003), but in contrast to Allen and Gale (1997) or Bhattacharya and Padilla
(1996), there is no intergenerational risk-sharing in this model.
12life. Their preferences are described by the same utility function as in the previous section.
Each household is endowed with 1 unit of labor when young and nothing when old. Labor
is supplied inelastically.
The timing of events is as follows. Each period is divided into two subperiods: in the
￿rst subperiod (the beginning), production occurs according to an endogenous growth
production function, as described below, factors get paid, and young households can
deposit their wage income in one of a large number of perfectly competitive banks. Banks
can use deposits to purchase existing capital from old households, to invest in new capital,
or to invest in storage. In the second subperiod (the end), depositors observe whether
they are patient or impatient and they can withdraw their deposits from the bank. The
details are presented below.
The beginning of period t: At the beginning of period t each old patient household
owns Kt units of capital and young households are endowed with Lt = 1 units of time.
Competitive entrepreneurs combine the capital and labor to produce a single consumption




µ, where ¹ K
1¡µ
t is a
positive externality of the aggregate capital stock at date t. Thus is the positive externality
of the aggregate capital stock on productivity generally assumed in AK-growth models.
The assumption of perfect competition in the factor markets, and the fact that labor is
supplied inelastically, implies the equilibrium real wage and real capital rental rate in
units of the consumption good are given by wt = (1 ¡ µ)Kt and rt = µ, respectively.
After the production takes place, old patient households consume an amount equal to
the earning from renting their capital and the net-of-depreciation value of that capital.
This corresponds to [rt + (1 ¡ ±)p
¡
t ]Kt units of consumption good, where p
¡
t denotes
the price of capital in units of the consumption good in the beginning-of-period capital
market. Note, in order for old patient households to be willing to rent their capital to
￿rms before selling to the banks, it must be that rt ¸ ±p
¡
t . We show below this condition
always holds under our parameter restrictions.
Each young household receives as wages wt units of consumption good. These house-
holds deposit their wage income in a perfectly competitive bank and enter a deposit
contract (d1t;d2t) before they ￿nd out whether they are patient or impatient.15 The bank
15It can be shown that it is optimal for household to deposit all of their income in banks.
13uses part of the deposits to purchase the existing capital (1¡±)Kt, at the price p
¡
t , from
old households and divides the rest of the deposits between storage and investment in new
capital. One unit of consumption placed in storage at the beginning of period t yields
one unit of consumption at the end of the same period while one unit of consumption
invested in the productive technology at the beginning of period t yields R > 1 units of
capital at the beginning of period t + 1. Note, the assumption that only banks engage in
purchasing existing capital, investing in new capital, and putting goods in storage at the
beginning of the period is innocuous. We impose parameter restrictions so the market for
existing capital always clears.
As in the static model, young households decide whether or not to become sophis-
ticated at the same time banks o￿er the deposit contract (d1t;d2t). Also, entrepreneurs
who produce capital using the long-term technology must be monitored if they are not
to shirk. We maintain the assumptions of the previous section concerning monitoring.
In particular, a young household that decides to become sophisticated must exert some
e￿ort and incur a cost of (Â ¡ 1) percent of lifetime utility, for some Â ¸ 1. We consider
the case of a proportional resource cost below.
The end of period t: Each young depositor realizes whether she is patient or im-
patient. Impatient depositors only value consumption in this subperiod when they are
young while patient depositors only value consumption in the ￿rst subperiod of t + 1
when they become old. The nature of the deposit contract is such that a depositor who
claims to be impatient gets paid d1t in this subperiod, while a depositor who claims to
be patient will get paid d2t in the ￿rst subperiod of t + 1. As will be shown, the deposit
contract o￿ered by banks induces sophisticated patient depositors to misrepresent them-
selves as being impatient. Depositors can purchase capital from the banks at a price p
+
t .
As was the case in the static model, banks are unable to prevent patient sophisticated
depositors from withdrawing because being sophisticated is private information. Further,
competition leads banks to supply the ￿nancial claims needed to meet the demand from
sophisticated households.
Using an arbitrage argument similar to the one presented in footnote 9, it can be shown
that the price of existing capital in the ￿rst subperiod (primary) capital market under
which the banks will be indi￿erent between purchasing existing capital and investing in





Our parameter restrictions to be speci￿ed below will ensure that this is the only equilib-
rium price for the existing capital in the primary market.
For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
X ´ R[rt + (1 ¡ ±)p
¡
t ] = R[µ + (1 ¡ ±)R
¡1] = Rµ + 1 ¡ ±: (20)
In words, X is the return on capital in each period. One unit of capital at the beginning
of a period can be rented to earn rt. The undepreciated capital can then be sold to
banks at the price p
¡
t . The proceeds from renting and then selling the capital can then be
invested in the long-term technology to produce new capital next period. We choose our
parameters such that X > 1 and °X < 1. Note, X > 1 implies rt ¸ ±p
¡
t , the condition
for old households to strictly prefer renting their capital to ￿rms before selling it to banks.
Given the availability of the storage technology, the equilibrium price of capital in the





With this setup the optimal contract is essentially the same as in the previous section




[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t)]




maxf1;Xgd1t ¸ d2t (ICS)
maxf1;°Xgd1t · d2t (ICU)
The de￿nitions of £t and i also are very similar.
£t ´
·







®¡1 + (1 ¡ q)]
¡1: (23)
15Solving the maximization problem subject to the (BC) only yields:
d1t =
X(1 ¡ µ)Kt




X ¡ (X ¡ £t)(1 ¡ q)it
: (25)
Taking the deposit contract as given, it is determined by
qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t) = Â[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d1tX)]: (26)





(1 ¡ q)X1¡® + q
: (27)
We consider Â 2 [1; ¹ Â], which guarantees the endogenously determined it 2 [i;1]. To see
this, substituting (24) and (25) into (26) to obtain
it =
X
(1 ¡ q)X + qA
; (28)
where A is given by
A ´
·





For the remainder of the paper we drop the indexes for it and £t since they are time
invariant.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which each bank holds the same portfolio.
The law of motion for capital is given by










X ¡ (X ¡ £)i
X ¡ (X ¡ £)(1 ¡ q)i
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt (30)
=
£ ¡ qX + qA
(1 ¡ q)£ + qA
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt:
It can be veri￿ed that the growth rate of the capital stock, de￿ned by
½ =
£ ¡ qX + qA
(1 ¡ q)£ + qA
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ); (31)
is strictly decreasing in Â. Intuitively, a larger cost to becoming sophisticated results in
less sophisticated households participating in the capital market. There is less investment
16in the productive technology and thus a smaller growth rate.16 We can summarize this
result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Economies with a more market-oriented ￿nancial system (economies with
a small fraction of unsophisticated depositors) grow faster than economies with a more
bank-oriented ￿nancial system.
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence found by Ergungor (2003) for
countries with ￿exible legal systems. Our model is more likely to apply to such countries
since, in our model, banks do not have an advantage over markets in enforcing contracts.17
Examples of countries with ￿exible legal systems and market-oriented ￿nancial systems
are the US and the UK. Germany is a typical example of a country with a bank-oriented
￿nancial system, but Germany does not have a ￿exible legal system. Examples of countries
with a ￿exible legal system and bank-oriented ￿nancial systems comparable to Germany
are Belgium, Finland, and Norway.
Our model also predicts that economies with a market-oriented ￿nancial system o￿er
less risk-sharing than economies with a more bank-oriented ￿nancial system. While it is
di￿cult to measure directly the amount of risk-sharing o￿ered by various systems, one
can think of indirect ways to evaluate how much risk sharing is desired in a country.
The tax system in the US is usually believed to be relatively less redistributive than the
tax system in Norway. This might indicate a greater desire for risk-sharing in Norway
compared to the US, which would be consistent with our model.
16The growth rate is greater than or equal to 1 ¡ ± (implying that markets for existing capital clear)
for all Â 2 [1; ¹ Â] if and only if
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)
1 ¡ ±
¸ (1 ¡ q) + qX
®¡1
® : (32)
The necessary and su￿cient condition for actual growth, that is, for the growth rate to be greater than
or equal to 1 (implying net investment is larger than or equal to replacement capital), for all Â 2 [1; ¹ Â] is
that
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ) ¸ (1 ¡ q) + qX
®¡1
® : (33)
17This does not mean that the trade-o￿ we describe in the paper would not apply to countries with
in￿exible legal systems. However, growth-enhancing activities on the asset-side of banks could make the
e￿ect more di￿cult to observe in the data in such countries.
173.1 Welfare analysis
While we have established that a market-oriented ￿nancial system promotes growth in our
model economy, there is no guarantee that such a system also improves welfare. Indeed,
the increase in growth comes at a cost in terms of risk sharing. In this section we consider
the mix of banks and markets which provide the highest welfare.





t[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t)] (34)
plus the utility of the initial old households given by u([µ + R¡1(1 ¡ ±)]K0), which will








X ¡ (X ¡ £)(1 ¡ q)i
: (37)
The expression for G is very similar to the expression for d1t, with K0 taking the place
of Kt. Hence, G is related to the amount of investment in the storage technology. The
direct e￿ect of an increase in G is to increase consumption, and thus welfare, but such
an increase could reduce growth and thus, indirectly, welfare. We call G the level e￿ect.
An increase in ½, the growth e￿ect, increases welfare directly. Clearly, £ corresponds to
the risk-sharing e￿ect. A reduction of £ means an increase in risk-sharing. The direct
e￿ect of this is to reduce welfare since, from equation (36), this reduces d2t. However, an
increase in risk-sharing also has indirect e￿ects on the repayments on deposits by a￿ecting
G and ½. From equation (37) it is obvious that an increase in the risk-sharing improves
the level of repayments on deposits. At the same time it reduces the growth rate as can
be seen from equation (31). Note, these three e￿ects, G, £, and ½, are functions of deeper
parameters that ultimately determine d1t and d2t.
It is easy to derive the following relations:
½
0(Â) < 0; £
0(Â) < 0; G
0(Â) > 0; i
0(Â) > 0: (38)
18Note that because of equation (26) the expected utility of sophisticated depositors is the same, in
equilibrium, to the expected utility of unsophisticated depositors. This is why we can consider only the
expected utility of unsophisticated depositors in our objective function.
18While a larger cost to becoming sophisticated￿i.e., a larger Â￿tends to reduce both d1t
and d2t through slowing growth, it tends to increase both d1t and d2t through increasing
G. There is thus a tradeo￿ between the level of consumption households enjoy and the
growth rate of the capital stock. An economy can start with a high level of consumption
and grow relatively slowly or, instead, start at a lower level of consumption and grow
faster. A larger cost also leads to more risk-sharing and more liquidity-insurance and,
thus, tends to reduce d2t through decreasing £. In this dynamic environment, there is a
trade-o￿ between growth and risk-sharing. Increasing one must decrease the other.
We are interested in the e￿ect of a change in the cost Â on welfare and the e￿ects we
just described imply that a change in Â may have con￿icting e￿ect on social welfare. A
given value for Â results in a given mix of markets and banks and we are interested to
know which Â corresponds to an optimal structure in the sense that the resulting balance
between growth and risk-sharing maximizes the social welfare.




G1¡®[q + (1 ¡ q)£1¡®]
½®¡1 ¡ ¯
: (39)
As expected, welfare increases with G, the level e￿ect, and with ½, the growth e￿ect
(recall ® > 1). An increase in £, corresponding to a decrease in risk-sharing, a￿ects
welfare positively. To understand this seemingly counterintuitive result it is important
to remember that G and ½, are functions £. A decrease in £ can be consistent with an
increase in welfare due to the indirect impact of £ on G and ½.
We want to ￿nd the value of Â that maximizes W. Such an optimum exists since W
is a continuous function on the compact domain of the cost. It is also clear that such
an ￿optimal￿ cost is a function of q;X;µ;±;®, and ¯, but is independent of the initial
capital K0. An immediate implication is that everything else equal, a country’s optimal
bank-market mix is independent of its initial wealth.19
Given the complexity of the expression for welfare, W, as a function of Â￿through
equations (39) and the dependence of G, ½, £, and i on Â￿it is di￿cult to obtain analytical
results for the value of Â that maximizes this expression. Therefore we look at some
19Although this result may seem counterintuitive, it should be kept in mind that, by assumption, the
development of the ￿nancial system is held equal in all comparisons. In actual economies one might
expect the development of a country’s ￿nancial system to be correlated with that county’s wealth.
19numerical simulations to get an idea of the trade-o￿s between risk-sharing and growth
involved here in enhancing welfare. We assume that a period in the model corresponds
to approximately 30 years. Parameters for the production function are standard from the
macro literature: we choose µ = 0:33 and ± = 0:96. The latter corresponds roughly to a
10 percent annual capital depreciation rate over 30 years. The model imposes r = µ. We
also choose R = 10, which corresponds to a value of X = 3:34. This yields an annual
return of capital of about 4.1 percent. Note, the inequality rR > ± is satis￿ed as it needs
to be. Our baseline for preference parameters is ® = 3, q = 0:2, and ¯ = 0:55. We did
extensive robustness checks over the parameter space and ￿nd that our results are not
sensitive to our choice of parameters.20
Our ￿rst numerical exercise concerns the e￿ect of risk-sharing on the optimal trade-o￿
between ￿nancial intermediaries and the market. We use the baseline parameters for all
variables except for the coe￿cient ® which we let vary. In each ￿gure, we provide two
graphs. The top graph shows the evolution of £, G, and ½ for di￿erent values of i. Here,
i is determined endogenously as Â varies between 1 and ¹ Â.21 The bottom graph shows
the evolution of welfare for di￿erent values of i.
As can be seen in Figures 1, 2, and 3, the maximum amount of welfare is reached for a
higher level of the cost Â as the value of ® increases. When the coe￿cient of risk aversion is
low (® = 2), as in Figure 1, welfare is maximized when the cost of becoming sophisticated
is zero and banks o￿er no risk-sharing. For a higher coe￿cient or risk aversion (® = 3),
as in Figure 2, the optimal cost Â belongs to the interval (1; ¹ Â). It is optimal for banks
to o￿er some risk-sharing, but less than in the static case. Finally, for an even higher
coe￿cient of risk aversion (® = 5), as in Figure 3, the optimal cost is high enough that no
household becomes sophisticated. In this case banks are not constrained in the amount
of risk-sharing they can provide but growth is slow.
The graphs representing £, G, and ½ are very similar in each case. As expected, the
growth e￿ect decreases with i as there is less investment in the productive technology. An
increase in i also means a decrease in £ which corresponds to an increase in risk-sharing
as the di￿erence between d1t and d2t decreases. Finally, an increase in i is accompanied
20We use Matlab to compute the numerical solutions to the model. The code is available from the
authors upon request.
21There is a bijective mapping between Â and i.
20by an increase in the level e￿ect G.


























Figure 1: The case with a utility cost
By looking at the individual e￿ects, it is possible to get an idea of how the overall
welfare changes. Comparing Figures 1, 2, and 3, the main di￿erence, for small values of
i (corresponding to small values of Â), is in the risk-sharing e￿ect. The increase in the
amount of risk-sharing provided by banks, as i increases from low values, is much faster in
Figure 1 than in Figure 2 and in Figure 2 than in Figure 3. Comparing the same Figures,
the main di￿erences for large values of i (corresponding to large values of Â) are in the
growth and the level e￿ect.
This helps explain the shape of welfare as a function of i. For low values of i, an



























Figure 2: The case with a utility cost
increase in the coe￿cient of risk aversion increases the e￿ect on risk-sharing. This means
that the e￿ect on welfare from an increase in Â gradually changes from being negative
to becoming positive. The main driving force of the changes for higher values of i is
the changes in the growth and the level e￿ect. These go in opposite direction and it is
hard to see from the graphs that the growth e￿ect becomes relatively less important as
the coe￿cient of risk aversion increases. Nevertheless, for a high enough value of this
coe￿cient, welfare is maximized if no household becomes sophisticated.
To summarize the results from our numerical exercises, we can say that if two economies
A and B are populated by households who have coe￿cients of risk aversion ®A and ®B,
respectively, where ®A > ®B, then households in economy A prefer a more bank oriented



























Figure 3: The case with a utility cost
system than households in economy B. As a consequence, economy A will have a lower
level of capital than economy B. When ® is su￿ciently small, the optimal system is such
that banks provide no risk-sharing. Intuitively, if consumers are not very risk-averse they
do not value risk-sharing very much and an increase in risk-sharing cannot compensate
for a decrease in the level of consumption that accompanies a reduction of the capital
stock. Conversely, if households are su￿ciently risk-averse the optimal system is such
that banks are not constrained in the amount of risk-sharing they provide.
In the appendix we report the result of another experiment where we change the value
of q, keeping all other parameters as in our baseline case. Figures 7, shows that if q is
su￿ciently small (q = 0:1), welfare is maximized in a bank-only system. As q increases,
as in Figure 2 (q = 0:2), the maximum welfare is reached with a mix of banks and market,
23where banks play a smaller role. For higher values of q (q = 0:3), as in Figure 8, a market-
only system maximizes welfare. This result might be due to the fact that when q is small
banks provide little risk-sharing but growth is faster. Constraining banks thus provides
little additional bene￿t. When q is larger the bene￿t from constraining banks increases.
We also did some experiments changing ¯ while keeping other parameters constant.
Perhaps surprisingly, changes in ¯ have very little e￿ect on the value of Â that maxi-
mizes social welfare. One might have thought that there would be an important trade-o￿
between early and late generations. Indeed, the bene￿ts from additional growth should
be felt disproportionately by late generations. A change in ¯, by modifying the relative
weight put on early and late generations can give a sense of the importance of that trade-
o￿. Our results suggests it is of second-order importance. We do not report graphs for
this experiment.
In another exercise, we change the value of R (which in turns modi￿es X). Here
we hope to capture the idea that developing countries, because they have a low stock
of capital, might o￿er a higher return on capital than more developed countries. Figure
9, in the appendix, shows that if R is su￿ciently large, corresponding to a developing
country, banks should not be constrained by markets very much. For lower values of R,
as in Figure 2, the role of markets increases. As R is decreased further, as in Figure
10, it becomes optimal for banks to provide no risk-sharing. The intuition is that as R
decreases, the income e￿ect dominates the substitution e￿ect and households want less
risk-sharing.
These results are consistent with the notion that developing countries (with low capital
stocks and high return on capital) should have a more bank-oriented system than more
developed countries in which capital is more abundant. In the development process, as
capital accumulates and the return decreases, the ￿nancial system becomes more and
more market-oriented. The usual arguments given to explain this evolution depend on
informational asymmetries and the high ￿xed cost of setting up well-functioning markets.22
Here we propose a di￿erent way to think about this evolution which depends on the
endogenous trade-o￿ between growth and risk-sharing.
22See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) or Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001).
243.2 The resource-cost case
We now consider the case of a resource cost. All relations up to (25) hold as before.
Taking the deposit contract as given, the equation for determining it is now given by
qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t) = qu(Cd1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(Cd1tR): (40)














We consider C 2 [C;1], which guarantees the endogenously determined it 2 [i;1]. To see
this, substitute (24) and (25) into (40) to obtain
it =
R
(1 ¡ q)R + qB
; (42)
which is constant over time, where
B ´
·





It can then be veri￿ed that as C varies from 1 to C, it varies from i to 1. Note that since
the corresponding £t > 1 and °R < 1, the solution in (24) and (25) satis￿es (ICU). The
solution also satis￿es (ICS) since R ¸ £t. Note also that since it · 1, we have £t ¸ R1=®.
We again drop the indexes for it and £t since they are time independent.
Since B is increasing in C, i is decreasing in the cost of becoming sophisticated.
In words, the smaller C, the larger the fraction of households who choose to become
sophisticated.
The analysis so far is homomorphic to the case with a utility cost, with the underlying
linkage C1¡® = Â. The implication for capital accumulation is, however, slightly di￿erent
here. We shall again focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which each bank holds the same
portfolio. The law of motion for capital is now given by










CR ¡ (CR ¡ £)i
R ¡ (R ¡ £)(1 ¡ q)i
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt (44)
=
£ ¡ qCR + qCB
(1 ¡ q)£ + qB
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt:
25Note, unlike in the case with a utility cost there are here two opposite e￿ects of a re-
source cost on the growth rate. The smaller the cost of becoming sophisticated, the more
households want to become sophisticated. This tends to help investment and growth on
the one hand. On the other hand, as more households become sophisticated, they use
resources to pay the cost. It can be shown that the positive e￿ect always dominates the
negative e￿ect. In consequence, the growth rate, de￿ned by
½ =
£ ¡ qCR + qCB
(1 ¡ q)£ + qB
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ); (45)
is strictly increasing in C. It is then easy to show the growth rate is greater than or equal
to 1¡± for all C 2 [C;1] if and only if (32) holds, and it is greater than or equal to 1 for
all C 2 [C;1] if and only if (33) holds.
Thus, regardless of how the cost is modeled, a general lesson is that a smaller cost leads
to more sophisticated households and a more market-oriented economy. While this results
in less risk-sharing and less liquidity insurance, it promotes more economic growth. What
mix of banks and markets is optimal depends on what mix of growth and risk-sharing is
optimal from a welfare point of view. We turn now to examining this issue.
The expression for welfare in this case is similar to the utility-cost case. It is easy to
derive the following relations.
½
0(C) > 0; £
0(C) > 0; G
0(C) < 0; i
0(C) < 0: (46)
We run a similar set of numerical experiments for the resource-cost case as we did for
the utility-cost case. We keep the same parameters for our baseline experiments. Figures
4, 5, and 6, graph welfare, as well as the three e￿ects that determine it, for di￿erent
values of the risk-aversion coe￿cient (in these graphs, ® = 2;3; and 5, respectively). The
graphs con￿rm the general story told in the utility-cost case. When risk-aversion increases
, there is a shift from a market-oriented to a bank-oriented system. Interestingly, with a
resource cost we are unable to ￿nd cases where the optimal cost corresponds to i 2 (i;1).
In words, welfare is maximized either when banks provide no risk-sharing or when they
are unconstrained in how much risk-sharing they can provide.
As noted above, one important di￿erence between the utility-cost and the resource-
cost case is that in the latter the cost paid to become sophisticated reduces the capital


























Figure 4: The case with a resource cost
stock and thus the growth rate of the economy. This e￿ect helps explain why having a
mix of banks and markets is never optimal in the resource-cost case.
Figures 11 and 12, in the appendix, show welfare for di￿erent values of q, the fraction
of impatient depositors in the economy. As was the case for the utility cost, an increase
in q leads to a shift from a market-dominated system to a bank-dominated system in
the resource-cost case. The intuition for this result is the same for both type of costs.
Finally, we considered di￿erent values of ¯. Again, changes in the value of ¯ have very
little impact on the value of C that maximizes social welfare. We do not report graphs
for this case.



























Figure 5: The case with a resource cost
Figures 13 and 14, also in the appendix, show welfare for di￿erent values of R (and
thus, implicitly, X). As in the utility-cost case, an decrease in R increases the welfare
associated with a market-dominated system and increases the welfare associated with a
bank-oriented system. Consistent with our other results concerning the resource-cost case,
the optimal mix switches from one extreme to the other rather than evolving gradually.
Figure 5 suggests that an exogenous decrease in C could hurt countries with bank-
oriented systems more if the decrease is small than if it is large enough to lead to a
complete change of system towards markets.



























Figure 6: The case with a resource cost
4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature comparing the relative performance of ￿nancial
intermediaries and markets by studying an environment in which a trade-o￿ between
risk-sharing and growth arises endogenously. Our model is consistent with recent evidence
suggesting that, in countries with ￿exible legal systems, market-oriented ￿nancial systems
promote growth compared to more bank-oriented systems. We consider a model in which
￿nancial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock, as in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Households can also invest directly on a ￿nancial market,
if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to provide risk-sharing
is constrained by the market: The more households invest directly in the market, the
less risk-sharing intermediaries can provide. On the other hand, overall investment in
29the productive technology is reduced when the available degree of risk-sharing in the
economy is increasing. This creates a trade-o￿ between risk-sharing and growth: While
economies that are more market-oriented always enjoy higher growth, countries with more
bank-dominated ￿nancial systems provide households with more e￿cient risk-sharing.
Regarding the welfare implications of this trade-o￿ our numerical examples show that
even though more market-oriented ￿nancial systems promote growth they do not neces-
sarily increase social welfare. We derive the optimal balance between intermediaries and
markets (or, equivalently, between risk-sharing and growth) in di￿erent economies. We
￿nd that, everything else being equal, economies in which households are more risk-averse
should be more bank-oriented. The intuition is that if households care less about risk,
they value the increase in the growth rate of the economy more than the loss in risk-
sharing. These results are robust to changes in the values of parameters in our numerical
simulations.
If a benevolent government can in￿uence the cost of having access to market, then the
policy implication of our model is clear. The government should in￿uence the ￿nancial
structure in order to have an optimal level of bank-dominance. The government could
a￿ect the ￿nancial system by modifying the costs of investing directly in the ￿nancial
market. For example, the cost of investing in the market could be lowered by introducing
more transparent accounting standards or implementing corporate governance codes that
provide better investor protection. This way the government would reduce the e￿ort
required from investors to e￿ciently select and monitor their investments. Similarly, the
costs of access to market could be increased by imposing restrictions on who is allowed to
buy and trade ￿nancial claims. How bank-oriented a particular ￿nancial system should
be depends on the economy’s deep parameters. In some economies, particularly less
developed countries with a high marginal return on capital, it might be bene￿cial to
make direct ￿nancial market access rather costly. In such countries a bank-dominated
￿nancial system could increase overall welfare even though it might limit growth.
It is not clear, however, that governments can directly in￿uence the general structure
of the ￿nancial system very much. Given the various elements that constitute the di￿erent
types of ￿nancial systems the governmental impact on the degree of the bank-dominance
30may be rather limited.23 Other factors such as the international integration of ￿nancial
markets could be important. In the case of bank-oriented countries, the international
integration of ￿nancial markets has made access to ￿nancial markets for households easier.
This evolution might have been welfare reducing if the initial degree of bank-dominance
in these economies was optimal before the international integration of ￿nancial markets.
In Europe, for example, the integration of ￿nancial markets has changed the ￿nancial
landscape entirely. Whereas in the early eighties ￿nancial systems were very di￿erent
across European countries, national particularities are vanishing. They are being replaced
by a more and more integrated continental European ￿nancial system, especially in the
Euroarea. If these economies and their ￿nancial systems are not too di￿erent this might
not a￿ect overall welfare very much.24
However, in the case of the ￿nancial integration of the UK and continental Europe,
the conclusion might be very di￿erent. Even though the economies are probably rather
similar (in terms of the deep parameters) their ￿nancial systems are generally seen as the
two opposite extremes. As Figure 5 suggests, this might be optimal for otherwise similar
countries. But our model also suggests that ￿nancial integration between these economies
could lead to an intermediate type of ￿nancial system making both countries worse o￿.
An integrated ￿nancial system could accelerate growth in a country like Belgium beyond
its optimal level while reducing growth in the UK. Hence, ￿nancial integration might
reduce the overall welfare of households in both countries.
23See Allen Gale (2000).
24This seems to be the case for most of the countries having introduced the Euro so far. See, for
instance, ECB (2002) Report on ￿nancial structure.
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Figure 7: The case with a utility cost



























Figure 8: The case with a utility cost




























Figure 9: The case with a utility cost

























Figure 10: The case with a utility cost



























Figure 11: The case with a resource cost


























Figure 12: The case with a resource cost

























Figure 13: The case with a resource cost


























Figure 14: The case with a resource cost
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